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Directors to hide from a sea of liabilities in
a new safe harbour
Mark Byrne*
The current business judgment rule provides a possible safe harbour to
protect officers from claims they have acted without the appropriate level of
care and diligence. Under consideration for some time has been a proposal
to introduce a broader and more generic type of rule to provide protection
against actions based upon any of the ‘core’ duties. It would extend immunity
from liability to cover s 181 (Duties of Good Faith), s 182 (Use of Position),
s 183 (Use of Information) and s 588G (Insolvent Trading). This proposal
was part of a Treasury Department review of corporate law sanctions.
Although there has since been a change in government, early indications
would suggest the Minister would be supportive of such an approach and the
new government has already taken steps to review directors’ liabilities and
consider the merits of a broader business judgment rule. The purpose of this
article is to identify the risks and inherent difficulties that must come from this
type of safe harbour. While the proposal may appear to be a simple
extension of the existing rule, the reality is that it must be quite different. In
the form it is likely to take there is the potential for it to be too generic and
weak. It is argued that it fails to take into account the nature of the extra
duties affected and the principles that underpin them. Further, in attempting
to overcome some practical concerns of directors, a new set of risks will be
created that could undermine the legal cornerstones of good corporate
governance.
1 Introduction
1.1 The current proposals regarding the new safe harbour
and its rationale
The Treasury released a discussion paper in 2007 which was intended to form
the basis of a review of civil and criminal sanctions in the Corporations Act:
‘Review of Sanctions in Corporate Law’.1 That paper considered a new form
of safe harbour for directors designed to protect against liability from all of the
core duties including:
• s 181 Duties of Good Faith;
• s 182 Use of Position;
• s 183 Use of Information; and
• s 588G Insolvent Trading.
It may, at first, appear as though it is a simple question of whether the
current business judgment rule should be extended beyond its application in
s 180 of the Corporations Act (and the equivalent common law duty) to cover
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the risk of liability from these other duties. Closer analysis however reveals
that this new type of safe harbour must be quite different. The current business
judgment rule preserves the duties of good faith and then focuses on the
essence of the duty of care and diligence in the decision-making process.
Because the proposed new rule seeks to offer protection against breaches of all
core duties it has necessarily employed much broader terminology. This may
mean the links with the duties themselves will be lost or weakened.
The rule as it had been originally proposed would invoke general protection
for directors where they act:
• in a bone fide manner;
• within the scope of the corporation’s business;
• reasonably and incidentally to the corporation’s business; and
• for the corporation’s benefit.2
The underlying rationale for a general and consistent defence for directors
that will apply across all core duties is to ‘alleviate concerns that some
sanctions are adversely affecting directors’ willingness to engage in
responsible risk taking . . .’.3
It is argued it will strike a better balance between the need for sanctions
against undesirable behaviour and the taking of appropriate commercial risks.
With respect, this has always been behind the push for a safe harbour since the
inception of the current business judgment rule. While so difficult to quantify,
the question has always revolved around the issue of the extent to which the
threat of personal liability for directors hampers their ability or desire to
engage in appropriate and commercial risk taking. The company is held out as
being the very vehicle that is meant to support entrepreneurial activity rather
than create risk aversion.
It is this issue which seems to have struck a cord with the Minister for
Superannuation and Corporate Law, Nick Sherry. Early indications would
suggest support for the argument that the current law on corporate governance
matters could be causing inappropriate risk aversion in our directors. In
February 2008, in a paper delivered on the minister’s behalf by the Secretary
to the Treasury, Dr Ken Henry, the minister made the following interesting
comments:
Australia’s corporate governance framework is highly regarded, both
domestically and internationally.
However, in recent years a cross-section of the business and legal community has
suggested that the law could do more for corporate governance, such as making the
standards required of our corporate leaders more precise. The specific concern is that
our corporate regime is causing directors to be overly cautious when making
decisions, particularly in fast-moving and complex business situations.
The decisions that directors make are central to the efficient operation of
companies and the wellbeing of our economy. Therefore, it is vital that directors’
duties and the associated sanctions provide the right incentives to create value.
2 Ibid, p 29.
3 Ibid.
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To this end, Treasury is examining these issues to improve and clarify the
corporate governance regime and will consult widely with industry and the
regulators to this end.4
This consultation by the government has already begun. It has been:
surveying 600 company directors to clarify the standards expected of them, with a
view to preparing a submission to Federal Treasury on potential legal changes.
Directors are calling for the government to extend the business judgment rule, which
offers limited protection for breaches of directors’ duties, arguing that liability curbs
risk-taking.5
So while there may still be further consultation, the current review of
sanctions and proposals such as the broader safe harbour would appear to still
be well and truly on the table. It is worth noting that this recommendation for
reform is one of many still awaiting the attention of the government. In a
recent article in the Australian Financial Review there was the suggestion that
corporate law reform was at a standstill.6 It highlights seven major corporate
law reviews, including the one dealing with the issue in this article, that are
still awaiting review and action.7 Even in this environment the article
emphasised the following comment from Mr Douglas Gration, a director of
Clarendon Lawyers, on the review of directors’ duties:
the key outstanding reform required in this area is an extension of the business
judgment rule to all directors duties.
Though we must wait to see what the government will propose, it is likely
this particular proposal will find the necessary support, politically and through
the efforts of relevant stakeholders, to again put it prominently on the agenda
for legislative reform. At that time it is hoped that the comments in this article
are considered. As will be shown in later analysis, it will be argued that the
claim at the heart of the proposal that the current legal regime causes serious
risk aversion in directors is to greatly overstate the matter. Rather, theory
would support an argument that directors may, on the whole, be considered
risk averse in any event because of a number of factors inherent in the
corporate structure. To suggest this is fundamentally the result of the relevant
liability provisions and that the problem can be overcome by a broader and
4 K Henry on behalf of Senator, The Honourable Nick Sherry, Minister for Superannuation
and Corporate Law, ‘Keynote Address to ASIC Summer School’, 19 February 2008,
Melbourne, at <http://www.treasury.gov.au/documents/1346/HTML/docshell.asp
?URL=Ministers_Speech_to_ASIC_Summer_School.htm>.
5 J Eyers and C O’Toole, ‘Directors face higher premiums’, The Australian Financial Review,
20 May 2008, p 1.
6 R Nickless, ‘Corporate Law Reform at Standstill’, The Australian Financial Review,
25 March 2008, p 6.
7 Ibid. The seven reviews considering corporate law reform that were listed are: Treasury
paper on directors’ duties and defences released 2007; Treasury paper on sanctions in
corporate law released 2007; Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee report on
personal liability for corporate fault released September 2006; Treasury review of
infringement notice regime, started 2006 but not yet completed; Corporations and Markets
Advisory Committee report on duties below board level, released April 2006; Corporations
and Markets Advisory Committee report on insider trading, released in November 2003 and
related Treasury discussion paper; and Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee
report on corporate groups, released May 2000.
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new type of safe harbour is unsupported. Further, it will be demonstrated that
the new safe harbour will bring with it particular risks that have the potential
to damage the effectiveness of the current duties of good faith and the duty to
prevent insolvent trading.
1.2 The development of the safe harbour concept
in Australia
The whole question of safe harbours has been canvassed in Australia since the
late 80s and early 90s. The business judgment rule first appeared as a
recommendation from the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and
Constitutional Affairs in 19898 and gained momentum in the few years that
followed. It became a recommendation from the Companies and Securities
Law Review Committee in 19909 and the House of Representatives Standing
Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs in 1991.10 There were of
course academic and other institutional champions for the cause, including the
Business Council of Australia and the Australian Institute of Company
Directors (AICD).11 The government when considering this issue at the time
of the Corporate Law Reform Bill of 1992, decided to leave the matter to be
developed by the courts, as had been the case in the United States where the
concept originated.12 There was a view that the ability of the courts to provide
relief against liability through s 1318 of the Corporations Act allowed scope
for this development.13 Relief in that sense of course could not equate to a true
safe harbour and the presumption of having no liability in the first place,14 but
nevertheless the wind went out of the sails of the proposition.
Although not appearing in the legislation, the proponents of the business
judgment rule may not have been too concerned about leaving the matter to
the courts in the year 1992 when Chief Justice Rogers handed down his
judgment in AWA Ltd v Daniels.15 As explained by Robert Baxt, the AICD
campaign, among others, for the business judgment rule was ‘“snuffed out”
(or rather thought of to be unnecessary)’ as a result of that decision.16 When
this judgment was criticised on appeal17 an increasing lack of confidence in
the ability of the courts to deliver the appropriate and consistent principles
8 Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Company Directors’
Duties, November 1989, para 335.
9 Companies and Securities Law Reform Committee, Company Directors and Offıcers:
Indemnification, Relief and Insurance, Report No 10, May 1990, at [68]–[92].
10 House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs,
Corporate Practices and the Rights of Shareholders, November 1991, para 5.4.30.
11 For a brief history of the attitude and campaigns of the AICD at this time refer to R Baxt,
‘The Business Judgment Rule: Have we reached a safe and sensible landing?’ (2006) 2(2)
Baxt Report 3 at 3.
12 For a discussion of this early history of the business judgment rule refer to R PAustin, H A
J Ford and I Ramsay, Company Directors; Principles of Law and Corporate Governance,
LexisNexis Butterworths, 2005, pp 240–2.
13 Explanatory Memorandum to the Corporate Law Reform Bill 1992, paras 88–89.
14 J H Farrar, ‘Towards a Statutory Business Judgment Rule in Australia’ (1998) 8 Aust Jnl
Corp Law 237 at 241.
15 (1992) 7 ACSR 759.
16 Baxt, above n 11, at 3.
17 Daniels v Anderson (1995) 37 NSWLR 438; 16 ACSR 607.
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developed. This led to a new campaign18 that was ultimately successful in
seating the rule within the statutory duty of care and diligence (but with its
application extending also to the common law equivalent of that duty).19
It would have been expected that in putting forward a broader safe harbour
that there would have been a particular focus on any new terminology and its
effects on the duties of good faith and the duty to prevent insolvent trading.
With respect, these issues have not been well canvassed. Perhaps this has to
do in part with understanding the nature of the operation of the new rule. If it
is to operate as a true safe harbour, that is, as a presumption of no liability
rather than some defence to the duty itself, then perhaps there may be an
attempt to argue it can stand on its own merits as a matter of policy. If its terms
are not met, then the question of potential breaches of any of the possible
specific duties will come afterwards. However, these matters cannot be so
easily separated. Whether as a safe harbour or defence the new rule could
protect directors from liability under all major duties and the relationship with
each therefore must be appreciated. Against this background however the
review largely revisited the existing generic arguments in support of a
business judgment rule with only limited attention to these specific matters.
That limited attention only comes in the form of some debate regarding the
effect on the duty to prevent insolvent trading and without any regard to the
duties of good faith.
The government did ask for submissions on the current proposal in its
consultation paper, Corporate and Financial Services Regulations Review.20
Submissions received in support touched on the following:
• There would be additional certainty about the legality of directors’
actions that would allow for less constrained decision-making;
• The broader rule would help to focus a director’s attentions on the
interests of the company;
• Protection should specifically extend to insolvent trading provisions
to save those directors who genuinely take appropriate decisions to
try and trade out of difficulties.
Apparently only a small number of submissions opposed any extension of
the existing rule. Possible specific negative consequences put forward
included the following:
• It could add to the complexity and cost in prosecuting potential
breaches;
• Allowing it to extend to the insolvent trading provisions would only
weaken their operation on the basis that it may be easier to take
advantage of this new defence than existing protections.
The purpose of this article is not to review the merits of having a safe
18 Baxt, above n 11, at 4; Farrar, above n 14, at 238 in reference to the following evidence of
support: Submission to Treasury by the Corporations Law Committee of the Australian
Institute of Company Directors on Duty of Care and the Business Judgment Rule, June
1997; D Tan, ‘Delivering the Judgment on a Statutory Business Judgment Rule in Australia’
(1995) 5 Aust Jnl Corp Law 442; R Baxt, ‘Do We Need a Business Judgment Rule for
Company Directors?’ (1995) 69 Aust Law Jnl 571; L Law, ‘The Business Judgment Rule in
Australia: A Reappraisal Since the AWA Case’ (1997) 15 C&SLJ 174.
19 Corporations Act s 180(2).
20 Australian Government, April 2006.
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harbour like the current business judgment rule as a process. Rather, it is to
question whether such a broader protective rule should operate at all to
provide immunity against the duty to prevent insolvent trading and potential
breaches of the duties of good faith. The first step in this process is to give
consideration to its possible terms.
2 The current business judgment rule and the
proposed terms of the new ‘generic’ rule
The current business judgment rule has the following four requirements which
must be met before the protection is provided:
(a) the judgment must be made in good faith and for a proper purpose;
(b) the officer must not have a material personal interest in the subject
matter of the judgment;
(c) the officer must be informed about the subject matter of the judgment
to the extent they reasonably believe to be appropriate; and
(d) the officer must rationally believe that the judgment is in the best
interests of the corporation.21
The first thing to note about the current wording is that it preserves the
duties of good faith within it. It is no accident that the business judgment rule
requires the officer to have otherwise acted in a manner consistent with the
same duties of good faith contained in s 181 of the Corporations Act before
it can be invoked. Indeed it seems clear that there is an evidentiary onus on the
officer to demonstrate an appropriate level of conduct in relation to these
duties before being able to take advantage of the rule.22
One of the fundamental problems with extending the rule to cover the duties
of good faith in s 181 of the Corporations Act is that retaining this first
requirement becomes a nonsense. It would be absurd to require evidence of
having met the duties of good faith in order to get protection from liability for
not having met the duties of good faith. Of necessity therefore, to introduce a
safe harbour across all of the core duties, you must apply a different generic
rule. This generic rule must logically be new in terminology to give it broader
application and this will bring with it all the potential problems of
interpretation.
As already indicated it would seem the proposed new generic rule would
require directors to meet quite different criteria. Directors would apparently
gain protection where they act:
• in a bone fide manner;
• within the scope of the corporation’s business;
• reasonably and incidentally to the corporation’s business; and
• for the corporation’s benefit.23
Before analysing the terms of the new safe harbour it is worth reflecting on
the nature of such a rule. Should this safe harbour stand on its own and be
independent of the duties, to reflect the more general expectations on officers,
21 Corporations Act s 180(2).
22 Re HIH Insurance Ltd (in prov liq) and HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd (in prov
liq); ASIC v Adler (2002) 41 ACSR 72; BC200200827 at [407]–[410].
23 The Treasury, above n 1, p 29.
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or is its purpose to provide more certain guidance on the essence of the duties
themselves to allow officers to act with more confidence and certainty? An
examination of the current business judgment rule would suggest it is the
latter. An examination of this new safe harbour would suggest we are dealing
with a completely new animal.
The current business judgment rule has built into it the essence of the duty
of care and diligence itself. The first two elements endorse the significance of
matters of good faith and integrity and the last two focus on the process and
objectivity of good decision-making. The need to be appropriately informed
on the subject matter has been at the heart of the development of the law on
this duty. Further, the need to make a rational judgment in the interests of the
company reflects the law’s development towards requirements of objectivity
both in the decision and in acting in accordance with a standard to be expected
of someone in that position.
The proposed new safe harbour bears little resemblance to the elements of
the duties from which it will provide protection. The first criticism is simply
that it lacks that connection. I suspect there could be an argument that a
generic safe harbour should have a different purpose. Perhaps it should be seen
as standing on its own, independent of the duties, to reflect and promote more
general expectations of officers and certainty of decision-making. With
respect, this is inherently hard to accept given that it would guarantee
protection against all of the core duties themselves. But in any case, it must
be doubted whether these specific words do actually reflect generic
expectations and certainty.
Of all the four elements, the first would seem most troublesome, at least in
terms of providing certainty. How would the requirement that a director act
with ‘bona fides’ be interpreted? It would seem most closely connected to
older common law terminology used when expressing the directors’ duty to
act in the interests of the company.24 To act bona fide in this sense was to
exercise the director’s power honestly,25 for the purpose conferred and in the
interests of the shareholders as a whole.26 If this element was meant to pick
up on this older notion of acting honestly then it would theoretically also
include the principles of good faith but then obviously there will be doubts
about the extent.27 In any event there will be concerns about the sense of
having to prove one acted honestly to gain protection from the breach of a
24 Chew v R (1991) 5 ACSR 473 at 499; 4 WAR 21.
25 Note that in D Greenberg, Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary of Words and Phrases, 7th ed, Vol 1,
Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2006, pp 296–8 the term ‘bona fide’ is defined with great
difficulty given its use in many different contexts. It does settle however on a fundamental
meaning along the lines of ‘honestly’ in reference to R v Holl (1881) 7 QBD 575.
26 Re Smith and Fawcett Ltd [1942] Ch 304 at 306; [1942] 1 All ER 542; Regal (Hastings) Ltd
v Gulliver [1967] 2 AC 134 at 137; [1942] 1 All ER 378; Re Southern Resources Ltd;
Residues Treatment and Trading Co Ltd v Southern Resources Ltd; sub nom Residues
Treatment and Trading Co Ltd v Southern Resources Ltd (No 2) (1989) 7 ACLC 1130
at 1147; 15 ACLR 770. For a detailed discussion on the authorities and the difficulties of
defining acts that are in the best interests of the company refer to R Langton and L Trotman,
‘Defining The Best Interests of the Corporation: Some Australian Reform Proposals’ (1999)
3 Flinders Jnl of Law Reform 163.
27 Australian Metropolitan Life Assurance Co Ltd v Ure (1923) 33 CLR 199 at 206 per
Knox CJ, 217 per Isaacs J; 30 ALR 53; BC2300005.
Directors to hide from a sea of liabilities in a new safe harbour 261
duty of good faith. Further, there will be other questions about how to test the
levels of bona fides? In the context of the common law duty, whether the
director did so act in a bona fide manner for a proper purpose was determined
subjectively.28 How does this then sit with the other more objective notions of
honesty and, more importantly, to what extent does the use of bona fides
support the broader and more stringent principles of law that better reflect the
current standards of expectations regarding good corporate governance?
The second and third elements seem to have their attention on the same
issue, which on the face of it, is whether the directors are acting intra vires.
Surely this does not have to be part of a generic defence. It is a sad indictment
of officers that we would need to flag this issue with such emphasis as being
a key expectation in terms of behaviour. It falls naturally out of an
understanding of the sources of power within the company for directors and
boards as a whole rather than needing to be integrated with each
decision-making process.
Finally, to simply require that directors’ act for the corporation’s benefit,
would ignite again questions about subjectivity and objectivity. Would it be
adequate that the director hold this intention without any benefit being
realised? Would it be adequate if the particular director saw the benefit even
though they were not acting or making decisions to the objective standard that
would be expected of someone in that position? Even if there was a role for
a stand alone safe harbour to emphasise generic expectations of directors this
could not fit the bill.
The rest of this article leaves aside the obvious difficulty with terminology.
It has as its focus the broader question of whether, in any event, it is
appropriate to extend the operation of a safe harbour to the specific duties in
relation to the prevention of insolvent trading and acting in good faith.
3 The consequences of the new safe harbour for the
specific core duties
3.1 A new safe harbour to protect against the duty to
prevent insolvent trading?
The original consultation paper from the Treasury, containing the proposals to
extend the operation of a business judgment rule to the duties of good faith
and insolvent trading, was released on 16 April 2006.29 Not long after that
Robert Baxt came out strongly in favour of this move and supplied further
arguments to help push along the proposition.30 It was suggested in that article
that this was ‘a sensible and important development in corporate law
reform’.31 Further, it was said to display ‘a more mature approach by our
principal policy makers in dealing with the obligations of company officers’.32
While the article generally considered why a broader business judgment rule
28 Harlowe’s Nominees Pty Ltd v Woodside (Lakes Entrance) Oil Co NL (1968) 121 CLR 483;
42 ALJR 123; BC6800800.
29 The Treasury, ‘Corporate and Financial Services Regulation Review’, 2006.
30 Baxt, above n 11.
31 Ibid, at 3.
32 Ibid.
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was appropriate and should not be feared, there was considerable focus
specifically on the question of extending its operation to protect against
possible insolvent trading actions. This attention reflected the author’s own
assessment that this was the ‘most controversial proposal’.33
The arguments canvassed the following key issues:
• That the case law on the current business judgment rule confirms
how difficult it is to take advantage of the safe harbour. The standard
being applied and the level of evidence necessary should be a
comfort to those who may see this as some form of easier escape
from the duties themselves;34
• That this standard is also evidenced in the cases that considered the
defences to insolvent trading. The courts’ reluctance to forgive
breaches is claimed to provide further evidence that a business
judgment rule extended to this duty would not open the floodgates
and be applied more generously;35 and
• That there is an underlying imperative that the law should better
encourage the entrepreneurial activity of the directors. ‘The role of
company directors in the context of the insolvent trading provisions,
should, in my view, be considered against a persistent judicial
“concern” that we should not snuff out the entrepreneurial spirit of
directors.’36
The first two issues above touch upon a fundamental and practical reality.
Any new and improved version of the business judgment rule will still be
subject to the interpretation and values of the courts. It is unlikely that the
standards expected of company officers that have been painstakingly
developed and honed over many years will abruptly be lost. Those
expectations have changed with the times and will no doubt continue to do so
in a manner consistent with developing business practices. However as a
matter of policy it is difficult to place too much emphasis on judicial attitudes
which may be hampered by the final drafting of a new rule.
The final issue mentioned above, and the driving force behind the safe
harbour concept, is this notion that directors must take risks. It is argued the
law should, provided the directors act honestly, reasonably and without
conflicts, support appropriate risk taking and entrepreneurial activity. Baxt put
this very eloquently:
There will still be a reluctance on the part of directors to take risks notwithstanding
the existence of the (business judgment rule), however at least there will be that
window of opportunity given to directors in some cases to take the necessary risks
that are commensurate with the existence of a entrepreneurial spirit which may lead
to greater success and fewer company collapses rather than more cases which have
to be taken to the courts to assess the alleged breach of directors’ duties.37
The Treasury paper itself, in reference to another Baxt paper, put the matter
more bluntly:
33 Ibid, at 6.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid, at 8–11.
36 Ibid, at 6.
37 Ibid, at 12.
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One viewpoint is that many directors who take risks when their company is close to
financial insolvency do so in the genuine belief that by taking the appropriate
investment or other decision, the company may be able to trade out of its financial
difficulties and should therefore have the benefit of additional legal protections.38
With respect, this proposition evidences in itself the very reason why it cannot
be accepted.
The real issue here is the timing of the risk taking. In its current form the
business judgment rule provides a safe harbour against claims that the director
did not exercise the appropriate care and diligence in their decision-making
(s 180 of the Corporations Act). If they were adequately informed and acted
rationally in the interests of the company they can take appropriate risks and
not be the subject of further action.39 To extend this rule to cover the situation
where the company is on the brink of insolvency is to give support to risk
taking which must inherently be different and much more dangerous.
Although possibly acting with the best of intentions, directors may at this time
take an ‘all or nothing’ approach which would lead them to take much riskier
decisions than may have ever been contemplated when the company had
better prospects. One cannot equate the rational risks contemplated by the
current rule because of its application to s 180 of the Corporations Act and the
possible ‘save at all cost’ risk when it is known the company may not survive.
A recurrent theme in the Robert Baxt article is that there is a general
reluctance by directors to take risks and that this is not going to change
following a broadening of the business judgment rule. While risk-averse
behaviour may generally be evident when the company is a going concern,
economic theory has long recognised the dangers in the performance of
directors as the company approaches insolvency, due to the changing nature of
their incentives. It indeed may become rational for them, depending on their
circumstances, to disregard risk given that those who will bear the cost of that
risk will be the creditors and not the company.
Economic analysis of the role of the director in the corporate structure
would confirm that shareholders could actually have reason to worry that the
structure itself causes directors to be risk averse in the usual running of the
entity.40 This would be particularly true for the larger public companies.41 The
incentives and benefits for the directors are usually in line with and in
proportion to the success of the company. There is only a limited market for
directors and they make significant investments in their own positions in these
companies. They personally have a lot at stake and this naturally affects their
38 The Treasury, above n 1, para 3.15.
39 Assuming of course they acted in good faith, for a proper purpose and without a material
personal interest in the matter: Corporations Act s 180(2).
40 M JWhincop, ‘Taking the Corporate Contract More Seriously: The Economic Cases against,
and a Transaction Cost Rationale for, the Insolvent Trading Provisions’ (1996) 5 Griffıth L
Rev 1 at 28; M Byrne, ‘An Economic Analysis of Directors’ Duties in Favour of Creditors’
(1994) 4 Aust Jnl Corp Law 275 at 277, 279; KArrow, ‘The Economics of Agency’ in J Pratt
and R Zeckhauser (Eds), Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business, reprint ed,
Harvard University Press, 1991, pp 37, 44–5; R Kraakman, ‘Corporate Liability Strategies
and the Costs of Legal Controls’ (1984) 93 Yale LJ 857 at 858–67; J Coffee, ‘Shareholders
Versus Managers: the Strain in the Corporate Web’ (1986) 85 Michigan L Rev 1.
41 Whincop, ibid, at 28; Byrne, ibid, at 279; Coffee, ibid.
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risk profile.42 However, most significantly for this analysis, that profile, may
change as the company moves towards insolvency. At that point in time the
assessment of risk from the perspective of the director is made in a different
environment.43 Any potential venture, even the very risky, that may turn a
profit could be all that lies between them and the failure of the company.
Given that their own benefits and utility is so closely linked to the company,
the element of risk may almost become irrelevant. It is not as though the
directors can diversify their investment in the company. What is the likelihood
of the director finding another such position when the company fails? So there
is a distorted payoff in favour of directors at the expense of creditors.44 After
all, at the point when the company approaches insolvency it is only the
creditors’ money with which the directors are playing. Arguably the matter is
considerably worse where the relevant company is closely held. The degree of
risk that creditors bear in this situation increases in proportion to the interests
the directors hold in the company. The greater the director’s own stake in the
smaller entity the greater the incentive they will have to look after their own
interests at the expense of the creditors.45
Ultimately therefore it becomes clear that the risk environment for directors
when the company is clearly a going concern and when it may be approaching
insolvency is quite different. It is inappropriate therefore to apply the same
rules to these two positions and to suggest that a general safe harbour could
be and should be applied in the same way.
At the time when the current business judgment rule appeared in the
Corporate Law Economic Reform Bill 1998 a comprehensive review was
undertaken to answer the very question of whether that rule should have been
extended to the duty to prevent insolvent trading.46 As indicated previously
there was support for a wider rule and lobbying for such an extension of
principle was as relevant then as it is now. The paper largely engaged in an
analysis of the rationales behind the business judgment rule and how these sit
against the case law in this area. The paper specifically addressed the
argument analysed above that the rule should extend to insolvent trading to
‘encourage entrepreneurial, rather than risk-averse, behaviour on the part of
the directors’.47 The point is made that the cases themselves do not evidence
much emphasis on this as a matter of concern at all because the real emphasis
in the cases is the need to protect creditors. ‘It is submitted that in cases where
a company is insolvent or facing insolvency it is reasonable that courts should
have less regard to whether their decision will encourage risk-averse
behaviour than in cases where the solvency of the company is not at issue.’48
There is also the reality that the insolvent trading cases usually are dealing
42 Independent directors would of course have less at stake although their reputation is
inextricably linked to the performance of the company.
43 Whincop, above n 40, at 28; Byrne, above n 40, at 277.
44 Whincop, above n 40, at 28.
45 Byrne, above n 40, at 277 in reference to P Halpern, M Trebilcock and S Turnbull, ‘An
Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in Corporation Law’ (1980) 30 Uni of Toronto LJ
117 at 135, 141.
46 R Langford, ‘The New Statutory Business Judgment Rule: Should it Apply to the Duty to
Prevent Insolvent Trading?’ (1998) 16 C&SLJ 533.
47 Ibid, at 539.
48 Ibid.
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with instances where the directors’ actions were far too late:
Indeed, it also appears that most, if not all, of the reported cases on the insolvent
trading duty in which directors have been held liable have involved situations where
the company has been well beyond the point where it could trade out of its debts.
The need to balance the desire to encourage risk-taking behaviour is therefore not so
relevant.49
Even if it could be said that risk aversion was a problem for directors when
the company is heading towards insolvency, any window of opportunity for
‘appropriate’ risk taking is likely to be very small indeed. Compared to the
demonstrable risk to creditors, it is suggested that on practical grounds it is
hard to defend any relaxation on expectations of directors at this time.
Other rationales and arguments in support of extending the business
judgment rule were also canvassed in the paper and met with similar practical
analyses. On the face of it there is a very strong relationship between the duty
of care and diligence and the duty to prevent insolvent trading but it was
argued this should not automatically support the proposition that a business
judgment rule should apply to both. Despite various points of overlap it was
demonstrated how they are nevertheless separate and distinct duties that
developed independently with different purposes. The stricter and more
specific duty to prevent insolvent trading is fundamentally about creditor
protection and acting as a strong deterrent to directors. There is no doubt that
the potential cost of insolvent trading is high. The funding needed to support
the national insolvent trading program of the Australian Securities and
Investment Commission and their crackdown on phoenix companies is
evidence of this.50 To relax aspects of this liability may only serve to
externalise the costs of this conduct and the fallout from the corporate failures
to such government agencies including the Australian Tax Office.51
Another point of contention is that uncertainties regarding director
accountability, liability and possible defences in the context of insolvent
trading could be overcome by the application of the business judgment rule.
The paper suggested the case law had already reached a point where any such
uncertainty was overstated and that sufficiently clear guidance was already
apparent.52 With respect, that argument has only been strengthened in the
years since the publication of that paper.
Finally, some recognition should be given to the options available to
directors when the solvency of the company has the potential to become an
issue. If there is a genuine desire by directors to seek to trade out of any
49 Ibid.
50 As to the national insolvent trading program, see <http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/
asic.nsf/byheadline/ASIC%27s+National+Insolvent+Trading+Program?openDocument>;
and for an example of the crackdown on the conduct, see <http://
www.asic.gov.au/asic/asic.nsf/byheadline/07-05+Phoenix+crackdown+reaps+results?
openDocument>.
51 For recent views of the Australian Tax Office on the importance of good corporate
governance and potential liability of directors see the following speeches in 2008 by the
Commissioner of Taxation, <http://www.ato.gov.au/corporate/content.asp?
doc=/Content/00163767.htm>, <http://www.ato.gov.au/corporate/content.asp?doc=/
Content/00153731.htm>.
52 Ibid, pp 558–9.
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difficulty then reliance on a business judgment rule should not be preferred to
the other strategies available designed to protect all stakeholders. Voluntary
administration with a view to executing a deed of company arrangement53
would facilitate a proper assessment of solvency, protection from personal
liability for the directors and recognition of the rights of creditors.
3.2 A new safe harbour to protect against the duties of
good faith?
The issue of whether there should be this additional protection for directors in
respect of the duties of good faith seems to have been absorbed into the debate
about the need for a generic rule. There appears to be an assumption that if the
rule was necessary, for the reasons already canvassed, than it should naturally
protect against all of the core duties including ss 181–183 of the Corporations
Act. The review itself gives particular attention to the application of a general
defence to the insolvent trading provisions as analysed above,54 however there
is no such treatment of the possible effects upon the duties of good faith.
Similarly, Baxt, in his article, considers the implications for insolvent trading
at length, as the more controversial matter, but does not consider the
relationship to the duties of good faith in any substantial way. It was only in
his conclusion where he specifically referred to the matter as follows:
The BJR (Business Judgment Rule) should of course be extended to the other
statutory duties — the duties in ss 180–183 of the Act referred to briefly above. We
will not see a massive outbreak of applications for the use of the BJR.55
With respect, the fact that the new rule may not be often invoked is not
evidence of itself that it is needed and appropriate.
As already discussed the current proposal is, of necessity, more than a mere
extension of the current business judgment rule. It needs to be housed within
more generic language to have the proposed effect. However, it would be a
shame to lose the appropriate connections with the duties in the new
terminology.
The current business judgment rule has, as its first criteria, the requirement
that a director must have made the relevant judgment in good faith and for a
proper purpose. While perhaps not requiring proof that s 181 of the
Corporations Act would have otherwise been satisfied, directors nevertheless
bear the evidentiary onus of establishing this element. The question of
potential conflicts is then dealt with as the second criteria. So even where the
relevant judgment could have been considered appropriate in the
circumstances of the company, if the director did not meet the personal
expectations of good faith, protection would be lost. The good faith element
is not part of the judgment itself but has been incorporated as a prerequisite
to protection. It gives recognition to the underlying fiduciary principles that
are at the heart of any directors’ role. These principles apply to every act of the
director. They deliver expectations that are personal to the directors
themselves and should make them review their particular circumstances.
53 Corporations Act Pt 5.3A.
54 The Treasury, above n 1, p 31.
55 Baxt, above n 11, at 12.
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These requirements come from the relationship itself and are therefore
inherent in the position. Duties of good faith are not questions of business
judgments. It is simply impossible for example to make a decision that
overcomes the need to act honestly or without regard to one’s personal
interests. Any new generic rule should not have the effect of watering down
the effects of ss 181 to 183 of the Corporations Act. Yet as a matter of logic
it must.
The professed purpose of the new rule is to provide greater certainty so
directors can feel more confident, if they meet certain requirements, that their
decisions will not be scrutinised after the fact. This may come at the cost of
a deeper appreciation of the duties of good faith. Rather than existing
terminology, the new rule must seek to describe or capture something simpler
and weaker. The proposed wording in the Treasury paper is evidence of this.
The only possible reference to matters of good faith in the proposed safe
harbour seems to be the first requirement that directors would have to act in
a bona fide manner. As already argued, this could result in interpretations that
would be anything but certain.
4 Inadequate justification to broaden the
statutory rule
4.1 Existing common law protection
At the time when the current business judgment rule was proposed, it had been
argued that this statutory intervention was not necessary because the essence
of the rule had already been embodied in the case law that had been
developing on the duties of directors.56 There was already recognition in the
common law, that the quality of directors’ judgments should not be a matter
for ex post revision by courts with a critical eye and the benefit of hindsight.57
Of course those judgments needed to be made in good faith and for a proper
purpose.58 Harlowe’s Nominees Pty Ltd v Woodside (Lakes Entrance) Oil Co
NL59 and Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd60 were the basis for this
original proposition. Further support could then be found in cases dealing with
directors’ duty of care where there was ‘judicial reluctance to “second guess”
business judgments taken without suggestion of bad faith and, indeed, a
judicial deference to such judgments’.61 Nothing has changed in this regard.
This is evidenced in more recent judgments of the Federal Court of Australia
56 P Redmond, ‘Safe Harbours or Sleepy Hollows: Does Australia Need a Statutory Business
Judgment Rule?’ in I Ramsay (Ed), Corporate Governance and the Duties of Company
Directors, The Centre for Corporate Law and Securities Regulation, Melbourne, 1997,
p 185.
57 Ibid, p 198.
58 Ibid.
59 (1968) 121 CLR 483 at 493; BC6800800.
60 [1974] AC 821 at 835; [1974] 1 All ER 1126; (1974) 3 ALR 448.
61 Redmond, above n 56, at 198.
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where reference is still made to these original authorities and the concept of
the common law business judgment rule:62
There is a well-known line of authority to the general effect that it is the province
of directors, not the courts, to identify where the interests of the company lie, and
that the courts do not exercise a supervisory function over the business judgments
of directors.63
Our presumption in favour of directors is indeed fundamentally consistent
with what is referred to in other jurisdictions as the business judgment rule.
We have received this recognition internationally. Despite the use of the term
‘rule’, as a matter of practice the application of these principles in the other
key jurisdictions takes the form of a like presumption by the courts that the
corporate managers have made appropriate judgments.64 In Canada the
Supreme Court has equated our common law principles to their ‘business
judgment rule’ and found a consistent approach with the United States, the
United Kingdom and New Zealand:
Canadian Courts, like their counterparts in the United States, the United Kingdom,
Australia and New Zealand, have tended to take an approach with respect to the
enforcement of the duty of care that respects the fact that directors and officers often
have business expertise that courts do not. Many decisions made in the course of
business, although ultimately unsuccessful, are reasonable and defensible at the time
they are made. Business decisions must sometimes be made, with high stakes and
under considerable time pressure, in circumstances in which detailed information is
not available. It might be tempting for some to see unsuccessful business decisions
as unreasonable or imprudent in light of information that becomes available ex post
facto. Because of this risk of hindsight bias, Canadian courts have developed a rule
of deference to business decisions called the ‘business judgment rule’, adopting the
American name for the rule.65
It is interesting that we felt the need to embellish the common law position
with a statutory rule. As discussed earlier in the article, the core underlying
argument by the proponents of the statutory rule is that it will better support
entrepreneurialism and the concerns about how directors deal with risk. This
same issue is behind the latest push to expand upon the current level of
statutory protection. It would seem however that this has been considered
elsewhere with the conclusion that the courts may still be the best place to deal
with this question. Consider the rationale provided in defence of the way the
courts applied the rule in the United States. Three clear principles were given
in support of their judicial process:
(1) The rule allows the court to recognise that ‘shareholders to a very
real degree voluntarily undertake the risk of bad business
62 Idameneo (No 123) Pty Ltd v Symbion Health Ltd (2007) 165 FCR 19; 64 ACSR 680; 25
ACLC 1847 at [114] and Downey v Crawford (2004) 51 ACSR 182; (2005) 23 ACLC 104;
[2004] FCA 1264; BC200406389 at [175].
63 Idameneo (No 123) Pty Ltd v Symbion Health Ltd (2007) 165 FCR 19; 64 ACSR 680; 25
ACLC 1847 at [114].
64 D M Branson, ‘The Rule That Isn’t a Rule — The Business Judgment Rule’ (2002) 36
Valparaiso Uni L Rev 631
65 Peoples Department Stores Inc (Trustee of) v Wise [2004] 3 SCR 461; (2004) 244 DLR (4th)
564; 4 CBR (5th) 215 at [64].
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judgment’.66 Because shareholders take management of the company
into account in their decision to invest they need to assume some of
the risk of bad decisions by that management;
(2) The ‘courts recognize that after-the-fact litigation is a most imperfect
device to evaluate corporate business decisions’. There is an
understanding that the ‘entrepreneur’s function is to encounter risks
and to confront uncertainty’;67
(3) ‘because potential profit often corresponds to the potential risk, it is
very much in the interest of shareholders that the law not create
incentives for overly cautious corporate decisions’. Shareholders can
diversify their holdings and minimise their risk. In that environment
they may want the directors to choose the riskier decisions on the
basis that across their portfolio, despite individual losses, they may
be better off.68
It is worth noting that these comments were made in 1981. As suggested
earlier, this whole question of the impact of potential liability on the attitude
of directors toward risk is not new. The issues have been understood for some
time and the clear message is that there is confidence that the courts can
recognise and take account of the questions of risk that are perennially raised.
The question still needs to be asked then whether an expanded statutory
version is needed to take account of such matters when this need is not
appreciated elsewhere?
4.3 Why do we need to go further than
other jurisdictions?
It should be recognised that our current statutory business judgment rule was
a long time in the making. As already outlined, it had been recommended on
numerous occasions and debate surrounding its appropriateness within the
legislation itself had been significant. Having modified the proposal after that
debate why do we now need to substantially alter it and take it further than any
other jurisdiction? In particular, why is there a new imperative to provide
insulation from the fundamental duties of good faith?
As with other advocates of the introduction of the statutory rule, Annette
Greenhow welcomed and embraced the current rule in 1999 with the
suggestion it would put the wind into directors’ sails.69 She, like others, was
concerned about the level of certainty in the judgments in the 1990s regarding
the expectations for directors.70 The introduction of the statutory rule came
with provisions that defended delegation and reliance on others and allowed
the statutory derivative action. Annette Greenhow recognised this package of
reform was ‘intended to find the balance between the freedom and flexibility
of directors on the one hand, and the interests of the shareholder on the
66 Joy v North 692 F 2d 880 (1982), per R K Winter J, with Oakes, Cardamone and Winter J
agreeing.
67 Ibid, at 887.
68 Ibid.
69 A Greenhow, ‘The Statutory Business Judgment Rule: Putting the Wind Into Directors’
Sails’ (1999) 11 Bond L Rev 33.
70 Ibid, at 35.
270 (2008) 22 Australian Journal of Corporate Law
other’.71 In describing the rule she seemed to endorse the need for directors to
otherwise act with the appropriate good faith, proper purpose and without a
conflict of interest. The benefits that were meant to flow from the current rule
were expressed as follows:
1. Providing an enhancement and clarification of the path to be followed in
making decisions.
2. Providing and awareness of the duties owed.
3. Encouraging responsible risk taking with the comfort of knowing that
decisions will not be second-guessed by the court if the four requirements are
met.
4. Attracting a high calibre of directors and officer to the positions knowing that
the duty of care is no higher than that expected of a reasonable person.72
It is now being claimed however that all these benefits have not been
achieved and that at least the last two factors are being raised again as the
reason to expand the rule to cover all of the core duties. Did the legislative
package get the balance so wrong that we have to revisit the issue?
Some answers to this question are proffered in a more recent review of the
business judgment rule by the AICD.73 The suggestion is that the rule has not
been successful because the Australian Securities and Investments
Commission have been able to make strongly negotiated settlements with
directors who may have been the subject of action and thus whittled down the
potential effect of the rule. Further there is the view that those few cases that
have made it to court have been poor examples of director conduct where
protection by the rule would have been unlikely in any event.74 Again in this
article, the lack of success for the rule is claimed to lead to the view that
directors will act in a risk-averse manner and that good people will not take
on the role. With respect, the fact that the rule has only been the subject of few
cases and that it has not been successfully raised because of the particularly
poor conduct by those directors, does not mean the rule needs to be enhanced
and provide greater protection. Rather, it could be argued, it is yet to be
appropriately tested and that concerns are anecdotal and based upon
perceptions not yet founded.
No other jurisdiction is proposing such a broadening of protection for
directors. Of particular concern will be the attempt to protect against the duties
of good faith. It is interesting to note that in the United States the duty of good
faith has grown in stature and is receiving greater recognition as an
independent basis on which to take action.75 This means, in the context of the
business judgment rule in that jurisdiction, that a potential breach of good
faith could be a less demanding means of overcoming the presumption of the
71 Ibid, at 37.
72 Ibid, at 54.
73 A Cromie, ‘Is the Business Judgment Rule Being Whittled Away? [AICD Review]’ (2005)




75 A S Gold, ‘A Decision Theory Approach to the Business Judgment Rule: Reflections on
Disney, Good Faith, and Judicial Uncertainty’ (2007) 66 Maryland L Rev 398; S J Griffith,
‘Good faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in Corporate Law Jurisprudence’
(2005) 55 Duke LJ 1.
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rule and enabling the courts to look more closely at the conduct of the
directors.76 Good faith has always been an integral part of the business
judgment rule in the United States and its influence is obviously getting
stronger.77 It is curious that when we adopted our current statutory business
judgment rule, largely based upon the American Law Institute’s Corporate
Governance Project there was a view the American version was too
permissive and we sought to further enhance the good faith element and
extended it to provide protection only where judgments were exercised with
a proper purpose.78 Yet, a broader safe harbour in our country may only serve
to weaken the role of good faith and the proper purpose test here.79
In the United Kingdom substantial research was undertaken on the question
of whether a statutory rule should be introduced there.80 A review of the
approach in Australia81 and elsewhere was considered at this time. There was
considered no need to move beyond their common law approach which, like
ours, prevents directors being judged with the wisdom of hindsight or second
guessed on the quality of commercial decisions. In fact there is a suggestion
that statutory intervention runs the risk of narrowing the principle or making
it too rigid.82
The question of whether a business judgment rule, at least in relation to
takeover law, could be usefully applied across Europe was also considered at
around the same time.83 There was an analysis of the difficulty in taking
common law standards and approaches into civil law countries. Although for
some countries the common law principles of the business judgment rule may
have proved difficult it was thought Germany may be well placed to interpret
and apply them because of their extensive case law around their Civil Code
requirement that all obligations be performed in a manner consistent with
good faith and common usage.84 These underlying principles were seen as an
important framework to any business judgment rule. Indeed, the principles of
good faith there have been judicially interpreted to become a ‘super control
norm’ and a principle of legal ethics which dominates the entire legal
system.85
Although there have been some concerns over recent decisions in Canada
76 Gold, ibid, at 434.
77 Ibid.
78 J Farrar, Corporate Governance: Theories, Principles, and Practice, 2nd ed, Oxford
University Press, Victoria, 2005, pp 142–3. See also a discussion of this in: D M Branson
and L C Keong, ‘Balancing the Scales: A Statutory Business Judgment Rule for Hong
Kong?’ (2004) 34 Hong Kong LJ 303.
79 Note that the proper purpose requirement may have been included in our version of the
statutory business judgment rule as a means of avoiding its application to takeover defences:
Farrar, ibid, at 142–3.
80 The Law Commission and The Scottish Law Commission, ‘Company Directors: Regulating
Conflicts of Interests and Formulating a Statement of Duties’, 1999, at
<http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/docs/lc261(1).pdf>.
81 At the time, our statutory version of the rule was being proposed: ibid, at [5.23].
82 Above n 70, at [5.29].
83 C Kirchner and R W Painter, ‘Towards a European Modified Business Judgment Rule for
Takeover Law’ (2000) 1 European Business Organisation L Rev 353–400.
84 Ibid, at 392–3, in reference to s 242 of Germany’s Civil Code. See in particular n 139 as to
the judicial interpretation given to the requirements of good faith.
85 Ibid.
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affecting the interpretation of their business judgment rule,86 there is no
suggestion they would consider taking the sort of dramatic steps we may
intend.87 In fact those recent cases have been interpreted as confirmation from
the judiciary that they will set the bar to any review of board decisions at a
great height.88
The whole question of the appropriateness of a statutory business judgment
rule has been analysed in the context of considering this possibility for Hong
Kong.89 It was recommended that the American Law Institute version be
adopted90 but there was certainly no consideration given to broadening its
application to matters of insolvent trading or duties of good faith. The research
demonstrated the significance of the umbrella requirement of good faith and
its utility in being able to appropriately bring down any shroud of protection
otherwise afforded to directors.91
Similarly while the New Zealand version reflects the American rule, the
good faith requirements remain.92
5 Conclusions
The analysis undertaken in this article raises a number of concerns regarding
the potential outcomes of the proposed generic safe harbour. Those outcomes
fall loosely into two categories.
Firstly, there is the inherent difficulty in manufacturing appropriate
protection for conduct that may otherwise run the risk of being in breach of
any of the many different core liabilities. There is a natural hurdle in
formulating a rule that purports to deal with the key issues relevant to all of
the duties. Instead of the certainty and clarity which is sought by directors, it
is much more likely, as is evidenced in the proposed terms, that we will be left
with generic elements that have the potential to undermine and weaken the
functions of the duties themselves and lead to new problems of interpretation.
Secondly, it has been demonstrated that there are particular risks relevant to
the specific duties against which the new safe harbour will provide refuge. Of
those raised in the paper, it is the following two that stand out most
prominently:
(1) There is the potential that the duties of good faith could be seen as just an
element of a business judgment rather than inherent obligations arising out
of the fiduciary relationship.
(2) The strongest rationale underlying the push for a generic safe harbour is the
claim that the current liability provisions make directors act in a manner that
86 Peoples Department Stores Inc (trustee of) v Wise (2004) 244 DLR (4th) 564; [2004] SCJ
No 64 (QL); [2004] 3 SCR 461; UPM-Kymmene Corp v UPM-Kymmene Miramichi Inc
(2004) 42 BLR (3d) 34; 250 DLR (4th) 526.
87 For a discussion of the fallout of these decisions on the business judgment rule in Canada,
see S Rousseau, ‘Directors’ Duty of Care After Peoples: Would it be Wise to Start Worrying
About Liability?’ (2005) 41 Canadian Business L Jnl 223–35; W D Gray, ‘Repap: A Study
in Judicial Review of Business Judgments’ (2006) 44 Canadian Business LJ 279–305.
88 Gray, ibid, at 304–5.
89 D M Branson and L C Keong, ‘Balancing the Scales: A Statutory Business Judgment Rule
for Hong Kong?’ (2004) 34 Hong Kong LJ 303.
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid.
92 Companies Act 1993 (NZ) ss 137–138
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is too risk averse. However theory suggests the new rule, in protecting
against the duty to prevent insolvent trading, could actually encourage
inappropriate risk taking at the other end of the spectrum.
In addition to the specifics of the proposal, the article reviewed the nature
of the business judgment rule more broadly. It is suggested that we may be
losing sight of the existence of these principles in the common law and the
flexibility that they provide in dealing with the modern challenges of directors.
This is recognised in many other jurisdictions. No other jurisdiction however
would seem to be prepared to provide a statutory safe harbour against
potential breaches of good faith. In fact, this principle is not only seen as an
independent fiduciary duty that should be protected but as a necessary means
through which the presumption of the business judgment rule can be
appropriately overcome. The arguments in favour of the proposed new version
of the rule are inadequate to justify such a dramatic step that is so out of line
with other jurisdictions.
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